Employees do not need to explain to their employers what was the ‘last straw’ that made them resign to rely on constructive dismissal.

In Thornton Print v Morton (UKEAT/0900/08/JOJ), the EAT upheld the original tribunal’s finding that Morton did not have to refer to the ‘last straw’ in his grievance letter because it was merely the occasion that led him to accept an earlier repudiatory breach which had not been waived.

Morton had worked for the printing company for 17 years before becoming joint managing director in 2001. In June 2006 he was given the task of announcing compulsory redundancies to the workers, causing “significant upset”.

Following this episode Morton was told by Thornton’s chairman and group chief executive that he had alienated the workforce and should stay away from the factory.

The chairman later encouraged him to resign and take instead a job as marketing director with a much lower salary.

Morton was then sent a letter inviting him to a disciplinary hearing, which, during cross-examination at the original employment tribunal he referred to as the ‘last straw’.

In August 2006 he wrote, through his solicitors, a letter saying he was resigning, but not mentioning specifically what he regarded as the ‘last straw’.

Delivering judgment, Judge Serota QC, said: “We do not consider, in the circumstances, that it was necessary for the grievance letter to do more than complain about the repudiatory breach of contract which led him to terminate his employment.

“It was not necessary for him to refer to any ‘last straw’; that was not part of his grievance. The conduct of the respondent prior to that date was.”

Judge Serota said: “The ‘last straw’ is in danger of becoming a term of art in employment cases. We note for example the use of the word ‘doctrine’ of the last straw that has appeared in this case.

“The principle, if it be one, means no more than that the final matter that leads to the acceptance of a repudiatory breach of contract when taken together and cumulatively with earlier conduct entitles a party to accept a repudiatory breach of contract, whether that last matter is in itself a breach of contract or not.”

Judge Serota added: “It is quite clear that the Employment Tribunal found there had been a repudiatory breach of contract which had never been affirmed and that the claimant was waiting as a reasonable precautionary step for the letter he had been promised before deciding whether to accept that repudiatory breach.”

Judge Serota said he supported the employment tribunal’s view that there had already been a repudiatory breach and that receipt of the letter inviting Morton to the disciplinary hearing was merely the trigger for the acceptance of that breach.

Chris Sheppard, solicitor at Stockdale & Reid in North Shields, Tyneside, represented Morton.

He said the case was a “classic example” of constructive dismissal, and was surprised that the company appealed, given the costs involved.

“This is also a good example of how solicitors have made employment law excessively technical,” he said.

“An employee does not have to go into extravagant detail about the grievance itself, provided the employer knows what he was aggrieved.”